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Abstract: This paper explores the determinants of access to finance for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in the context of three Central European countries: Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, and Hungary. The data set of the research is obtained from 
the BEEPS survey, which is conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. This paper empirically analyses firms not only from 
the SMEs point of view, but also shows results for micro, small and medium enterprises 
separately. Additionally, we have analysed the determinants of access to finance for 
SMEs at each country level for an in-depth understanding of country-level variations in 
SME financing. The results indicate that micro firms and firms owned and operated by 
women are experiencing a shortage of credits from banks.  On the other hand, we found 
a positive relationship between the pledge of collateral and access to finance. With 
respect to the medium firms, we found evidence that innovative firms have a larger 
amount of credit from banks. The empirical results also suggest that the loan size 
increases as the interest rates increase in particular for SMEs on the whole and for 
micro-firms, although the interest rate is in a negative relationship with the loan size in 
Czech Republic. 
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Introduction 
A number of studies have focused on SMEs and bank financing due to the extreme 
importance of SMEs to the world economies (Beck et al., 2006; Ayyagari et al., 2007; 
Lee et al., 2015; Hanedar et al., 2014; Belas and Sopkova, 2016).  Ayyagari et al. (2007) 
showed that SMEs are solely responsible for the creation of about 60 percent of 
employment in the manufacturing sector in their analysis of 76 developed and 
developing countries. Beck et al. (2006) using the World Business Environment Survey 
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(WBES) found that lack of long-term bank finance is the second most important 
financing difficulty faced by the SMEs, while high-interest rates and collateral 
requirement are on the first and third place.  Regardless of significant contribution to the 
economy, the survival rate of SMEs is significantly lower than that of large corporate 
firms due to various reasons, including restricted access to bank finance, high interest 
rates, lack of skilled labour force, existence of technological and financial risks, severe 
competition from large firms etc.  
Particularly, SMEs face credit discrimination from banks because of their information 
opacity. It is quite common that SMEs do not have audited financial statements and, in 
fact, it is difficult for the SMEs to show their credit quality, hence, they are credit 
rationed by banks (Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). In the face of 
information opacity, commercial banks make loan decisions based on their own credit 
rating models that depend on their own methodological structure. Due to the ambiguous 
nature of the credit rating models and information asymmetry between banks and the 
SMEs, banks can impose not only higher prices of the loans, but also non-price related 
restrictions in SME lending, for example, collateral, shorter maturity, and smaller loan 
size (Hanedar et al., 2014; Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; 
Hernandez-Canovas and Koeter-Kant, 2011; Farinha and Felix, 2015; Kirschemann, 
2016).  In contrast, large firms can produce better financial statements, which can help 
them to get easy access to bank finance (Cenni et al., 2015; Leon, 2015; Knyazeva and 
Knyazeva, 2012; Berger and Udell, 2002).  
The data of this study came from the survey of BEEPS V, which is a joint project of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank 
(WB). BEEPS conducted surveys in 30 transition economies covering Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia and Turkey. In this paper, we aim to explore the determinants of 
access to finance for SMEs in three Central European countries - Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, henceforth CR, SKR and Hungary. We have purposefully selected 
these countries, as our persuasion is that these countries have similar economic 
conditions and hence exploring the bank financing differences may highlight important 
findings for SMEs. On the other hand, research shows that SMEs contribute about 65% 
of total employment in the Czech Republic, 59% in the Slovak Republic, and 46% in 
Hungary (Ayyagari et al., 2007). Considering the importance of SMEs in the economic 
systems of these three countries, investigating the factors that may affect access to bank 
finance can help the SMEs to overcome the shortage of bank finance and subsequently 
can enable them to invest more in activities with added economic value.   
Empirical research explored many factors that affect the access to finance for SMEs, 
such as information asymmetry, firm characteristics, availability of collateral, borrower 
characteristics, lender characteristics, bank market structure and others (Hernandez-
Canovas and Martinez-Solano, 2010; Cenni et al., 2015; Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Irwin and Scott, 2010; Stefani and 
Vacca, 2015; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Beck et al., 2011; Leon, 2015; Godlewski and 
Weill, 2011). It could mean that firms with low information asymmetry, lower risk and 
pledging collateral to banks might get a larger loan. On the other hand, firms with 
higher information asymmetry, poor borrower quality or higher probability of defaults 
can receive a smaller loan size or may face credit rationing. Therefore, we may argue 
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that the firms which can show better credit quality to banks might receive larger loans 
and firms with poor credit quality or higher information asymmetry may be credit 
rationed or can only obtain a small loan. We used loan size, as a proxy to measure the 
hypotheses of access to finance and examining the effect of firm size, firm age, female 
owner, firm innovativeness, crime as a proxy of firm riskiness, collateral and interest 
rates in relation to access to finance. 
This study may have a significant impact on policy making for the Central European 
countries. Moreover, our data set allows us to divide the analysis based on countries and 
thus, we can find out the important factors that affect the access to credit for SMEs from 
the country perspective. Overall, the paper makes a significant contribution to 
understanding the SME finance in the context of bank-based European countries and 
adds value to the SME bank financing literature.  
The structure of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data set and model as well as descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical results and it is followed by the concluding 
remarks. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Studies used firm size as a proxy for better credit quality and showed that it can 
positively affect the access to credit (Cenni et al., 2015; Hernandez-Canovas and 
Martinez-Solano, 2010; Cole, 1998). As the firm gets larger, it can acquire more 
tangible assets that can be useful for banks in assessing the credit risk of the firm 
(Gompers, 1995). At the same time, large firms can gain more bargaining power and 
they can negotiate with banks the credit terms which may facilitate loans with fewer 
restrictions and larger loan sizes (Cenni et al., 2015). Brancati (2015) showed that micro 
firms in the Italian market are more credit constrained than the small or medium firms 
as information opacity is even more severe for the micro firms. It is obvious that micro 
firms have a lower level of asset tangibility and it is difficult to assess their future 
growth rate. Similarly, large firms can more easily show better information transparency 
to banks by producing audited financial statements (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; 
Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Overall, the above studies show that 
lower information opacity of large firms and reduced information asymmetry can 
positively affect the access to bank finance for SMEs. Therefore, we expect that the firm 
size may be positively related to the access to finance. 
On the other hand, research shows that younger firms are more vulnerable to having 
restricted access to bank finance because information transparency is lower. It also 
argues that younger firms have a lower level of asset intensity and because of it they are 
credit rationed (Ferri and Murro, 2015). Similarly, banks are reluctant to lend money to 
younger firms, as it is found that survival rates of younger firms are lower than of older 
firms (Dierkes et al., 2013). Kirschemann (2016) in her study found out that younger 
firms are more likely to be credit rationed since they previously did not receive any 
loans from banks and as a result, it is difficult for banks to judge the loan repayment 
history. Moreover, access to credit also depends on the survival analysis of firms and 
Shumway (2001) showed that default rates of younger firms are higher than those of the 
Brought to you by | Univerzita Tomase Bati ve Zline
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/7/17 3:26 PM
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
266 
older firms. From a bank-borrower relationship point of view, older firms can make a 
long-term relationship with banks which is less likely for the younger firms. Thus, 
based on the relationship banking, older firms can receive more credit from banks 
(Comeig et al., 2015; Cenni et al., 2015; Uchida et al., 2012; Bolton et al., 2013). 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned literature, we hypothesised that there may be a 
positive relationship between firm age and access to bank finance. 
Hypothesis 1: Firm size is positively related to access to finance because of better 
information transparency. 
Hypothesis 1a: Firm age is positively related to access to finance. 
Gender discrimination in loan markets is under severe scrutiny from both policy makers 
and researchers. It is a serious concern that the firms owned and operated by women 
face difficulties in getting access to bank finance due to stereotype gender 
discrimination (Carter and Rosa, 1998). Financial institutions refuse to provide women 
with credit, as it is difficult for banks to make a correct evaluation of their credit risk 
due to lack of skills, technical knowledge and previous experience (Irwin and Scott, 
2010). Moreover, women are reluctant to accept bank credit since they are afraid to lose 
control over their business (Watson et al., 2009). Stefani and Vacca (2015) in the 
context of Germany, Italy, France and Spain found that women are less motivated to get 
loans from banks since they are afraid that their application will be rejected. Hence, 
women are more interested to use credit from their family members, friends and 
relatives. The research also showed that women-owned firms mainly operate in the 
service and retail sectors and as a result, they do not have sufficient collateral to pledge 
and due to this they are credit rationed. Alesina et al. (2013) found that women-owned 
firms in Italy pay higher interest rates than the men-owned, but they did not find any 
evidence that women-owned firms in Italy are riskier than male-owned firms. A study 
by Muravyev et al. (2009) by examining the BEEPS data also found some financing 
difficulties for women-based firms. Research found that women are credit rationed not 
only due to their business characteristics, but also because of their individual 
characteristics, such as lack of education, experience and less family support (Garwe 
and Fatoki, 2012). A similar study by Belluchi et al. (2010) in the context of Italian 
women-based SMEs shows that firms owned and operated by female entrepreneurs face 
stricter credit conditions from banks, for example lower credit limits, higher collateral 
and interest rates on their loan contract. Hence, the study suggests that women-owned 
firms face more financial constraints than the male-owned firms. Taking the above-
mentioned arguments in consideration, we hypothesized that women-owned firms may 
face more credit constraint from banks and it may also lower their credit limits on the 
loan contracts and because of that access to finance may be negatively related to female 
ownership. 
H2: Female ownership of firms is negatively related to access to finance.  
Research shows that innovation is significantly important for the long-term growth of 
firms in order to attract new customers. By innovating, a firm can create a competitive 
advantage over its competitors which helps to earn extra profit margin for the 
innovative firm (Baregheh et al., 2009). Previous studies found that European SMEs are 
more likely to depend on bank loans to support their innovative ideas because they 
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cannot raise funds from the external financial market (Lee et al., 2015; Freel, 2007). 
However, the lack of support from commercial banks is negatively affecting the ability 
of the firms to innovate (Mohnen and Roller, 2005). Investments in innovative activities 
are usually risky since returns from the investments are uncertain (Hall, 2002). Lee et al. 
(2015) in the context of UK showed that innovative firms look for more external 
sources of finance than the non-innovative firms. They also show that innovative firms 
are more likely to be credit rationed than the non-innovative ones. Pederzoli et al. 
(2013) showed that default rates of the innovative firms are higher than those of the 
firms that do not innovate. They argue that in most of the cases R&D investments for 
SMEs do not pay off as it was estimated before and hence innovative SMEs experience 
more defaults. Brancati (2015) studied the financing possibilities for innovative firms in 
the Italian market and found that hi-tech firms are credit rationed by banks more than 
the non-technological or non-innovative firms. The author argues that commercial 
banks cannot evaluate the growth prospects of innovative firms and that may lead to the 
lack of finance. Because of the uncertainties related to the innovative SMEs, they are 
considered as risky investment by banks and, hence, it is more likely that innovative 
SMEs may receive lower amount of loans from banks.  Therefore, we suppose that there 
may exist a negative relationship between firm innovativeness and access to finance.  
H3: Firm innovativeness is negatively related to access to finance. 
 Empirical research examines the borrower risk profile and financial constraints for 
SMEs from various perspectives. Because of higher borrower risk, lenders may reduce 
the loan size and hence, SMEs may face more credit rationing (Kirschemann, 2016). 
Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) showed that risky borrowers receive loans with shorter 
maturity. Godlewski and Weill (2011) found that high-risk firms provide more collateral 
than the less risky firms do. Therefore, the literature suggests that riskier borrowers are 
more financially constrained and they experience more stringent credit terms than the 
less risky firms. We examine the firm riskiness in terms of theft, robbery, arson and 
vandalism. It is likely that the losses which SMEs incurred due to theft or robbery can 
have a significant negative effect on their profit margin. This may raise question about 
their survival. Hander et al. (2014) using the data provided by BEEPS showed that the 
firms which face crime and lose products due to theft and robbery are required to 
provide more collateral as it signals higher credit risk to the lender.  Therefore, we argue 
that the riskier firms are more likely to be financially constrained than firms with low-
risk profile. Because of that access to finance may be negatively related to firm 
riskiness. 
H4: Firm riskiness is negatively related to access to finance.  
The collateral requirement in a loan contract is a conventional way of reducing credit 
risk to the borrower. Due to information asymmetry in SME lending, commercial banks 
face difficulties in pricing the loans and lending decision leading to credit rationing may 
be difficult for them (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Hence, to show better credit quality to 
banks, firms usually pledge collateral and by doing so, they can reduce credit rationing. 
Research also shows that collateral is a positive signal for banks to reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard as it is less likely that poor quality borrowers may pledge 
collateral. Because loan defaults may cause the poor-quality borrowers to lose control 
over the asset and hence poor quality borrowers have less incentives to provide 
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collateral (Bester, 1987; Chan and kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Hainz et al., 2013). Therefore, the above-mentioned 
literature concluded that collateral acts as a signalling device for the lenders to sort out 
quality borrowers from the risky borrowers. Thus, if collateral is in fact a signal for 
better borrower quality, pledging collateral may positively affect the access to finance 
for SMEs because of lower credit risk.  
H5: Availability of collateral increases access to finance. 
Higher interest rates are significant obstacles for small business lending and SMEs are 
discouraged to take loans from banks, as they cannot agree with the price of the loans. 
Beck et al. (2006) used the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and showed 
that a high interest rate is the most important financing obstacle for SMEs among 12 
examined financing obstacles. Farinha and Felix (2015) found that banks with lower 
interest rates received more loan applications as compared to banks with higher interest 
rates in Portugal. A study also showed that higher interest rate is one of the most 
significant factors for SMEs causing loan default as the higher price of loans increases 
the debt burden for SMEs (Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015). Nevertheless, many factors affect 
interest rates on loan contract, such as relationship lending, availability of collateral, 
credit market concentration and competition, bank size and bank ownership type, 
borrower characteristics, firm characteristics, loan maturity, loan size and others (Berger 
and Udell, 2002; Cole, 1998; Carter et al., 2004; Rahman et al., 2016a; Menkhoff et al., 
2012; Steijvers et al., 2010; Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Berger et al., 2011; Brick and 
Palia, 2007; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano, 
2010; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bonini et al., 2015; Beck et al., 2011; Mian, 2003; 
Rahman et al., 2016b; Neuberger and Rathke-Doppner, 2015; Stefani and Vacca, 2015). 
An empirical research shows that borrowers are discouraged to get loans from banks 
when the cost of loans are too high because it increases their debt burden and that can 
negatively affect the value of the firm (Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano, 
2010). As such, we expect to find a negative relationship between access to finance and 
interest rates, as higher borrowing costs may discourage the borrowers to take larger 
loans from the bank. 
H6: Interest rate is negatively related to access to finance. 
Statistical Model and the Variables 
We run the following ordinary least square regression in order to achieve the objectives 
of the paper. 
Ln (LoanSize) = 𝜷0 +𝜷1 FirmSize +𝜷2 FirmAge+𝜷3 FirmAgeSquare +𝜷4 Female +𝜷5 
Innovation +𝜷6 Crime + 𝜷7 Collateral+ 𝜷8 InterestRate +𝝁 
The dependent variable loan size, which is a proxy for access to finance, is converted 
from the local currencies to US dollars to give the analysis more uniformity. We 
obtained the loan size information from the BEEPS survey question where the firm 
manager was asked about the particular question “Referring only to this most recent 
loan or line of credit, what was its value at the time of approval”.  
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To test the hypotheses, we arranged the variables according to firm and loan 
characteristics. Regarding the firm-specific characteristics, we observed five (FIRM 
AGE, FIRM SIZE, FEMALE, INNOVATION, CRIME/THEFT) variables that can affect 
commercial bank decisions for granting credit to the firms. FIRM SIZE is examined 
through the number of full-time employees the firm was employing during the survey 
period. It is more likely that larger firms can gain more bargaining power and acquire 
more assets that can show better credit quality of the firm. Hence, we expect to find a 
positive relationship between FIRM SIZE and LOAN SIZE. FIRM AGE is the number of 
years the firm is in existence with continuous operation. We added also firm age 
squared in the model in order to capture the non-linearity. We believe that as a firm gets 
older, it can more easily prove its credit worthiness to the bank by presenting its past 
business track records and it can make a long-term relationship with the bank. 
Therefore, we expect to find a positive relationship between access to finance and FIRM 
AGE. FEMALE (1) dummy represents if the firm is owned by female and zero 
otherwise. FEMALE dummy is employed to find whether women-owned firms are 
facing any financial constraints in the loan market. As literature shows, women-owned 
firms are facing more credit rationing than the male-owned firms do. In that context, we 
expect to find a negative relationship between LOAN SIZE and FEMALE. 
INNOVATION (1) dummy represents if the firm has introduced any new products and 
services within the last three years and otherwise zero. It is widely accepted that the 
returns from the innovation and R&D activities are uncertain and as a result, firms with 
innovation activities are experiencing lack of finance from banks. Hence, we expect to 
find a negative relationship between INNOVATION and LOAN SIZE. CRIME/THEFT 
(1) dummy represents if the firm experienced any losses caused by theft, robbery, 
vandalism or arson and zero otherwise. CRIME/THEFT shows the firm riskiness of 
defaults and we expect that firms that experienced losses due to theft and robbery are 
more likely to receive smaller loans from banks and thus, we expect a negative 
relationship between CRIME/THEFT and LOAN SIZE. One could question how the 
validity of the claim that innovation (INNOVATION) activity of the firm and 
information regarding firm’s past losses due to crime, vandalism or arson 
(CRIME/THEFT) could be established in the context of our current research? It is 
worthwhile to mention that, we completely rely on the voluntary disclosure of all 
information from the SMEs during the period of BEEPS survey. Moreover, depreciation 
on R&D activities or how much firms spent on R&D in terms of total sales could be 
more appropriate proxy to find out the innovation tendency of the SMEs, however the 
survey did not have any information regarding this topic, hence, we used innovation 
activity of the firms to investigate the relationship between innovation and access to 
finance.  
The loan characteristic variables of the paper include two items, presence of collateral 
and interest rates. COLLATERAL (1) is a dummy variable that represents if the firm has 
pledged any sort of collateral while getting credit from the bank and zero otherwise. As 
research shows that collateral signals a better credit quality of the borrower by 
eliminating moral hazard and adverse selection problem, we expect to find a positive 
connection between COLLATERAL and LOAN SIZE. INTEREST RATE is the rate of 
interest that is charged on the loan contract. The research assumes to find a negative 
relationship between INTEREST RATE and LOAN SIZE since a higher interest rate will 
discourage the borrowers to access larger loans from the bank. 
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Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data set we have used for the analysis is obtained from the BEEPS V survey, which 
is a joint project of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the World Bank (WB). BEEPS survey V was conducted in between 2012-2014 in 
30 developed, developing and emerging markets to examine the business environment 
conditions of SMEs in the examined countries. The data set covers 15,883 enterprises, 
which range from micro, small, medium to large firms. The paper defined SMEs 
according to the conventions of both OECD and BEEPS - the number of employees is 
less than 250. We did not consider any subsidiaries or business partner that are linked 
with the SMEs because these external entities may also influence the bank decision in 
lending to the SMEs and that may distort the aim of the research.  
The loan amount that we used for our empirical analysis is drawn from the BEEPS 
survey V (2012-2014), and we found that most of the recent loans of the SMEs were 
approved during the period of 2010-2011 and afterwards. It may be stressed that after 
the recent financial crisis banks are providing more loans to the SMEs. However, the 
survey did not cover how many loans are taken by the firm in the same fiscal year 
which would have helped us in better understanding the characteristics of the firms that 
are taking more loans per year and also their investment strategy.  
The BEEPS data set covers 254 firms in the CR, where 236 firms are covered by the 
BEEPS V and 18 firms were from earlier surveys. Out of these 254 firms, 16 firms had 
more than 250 employees so we had to exclude them from empirical analysis and finally 
obtained 238 SMEs for analysis.  
In terms of SKR, the BEEPS survey examined 276 firms but due to poor data quality it 
dropped 8 firms and reported 268 firms in the main database. To comply with the aim of 
this paper, we excluded the large firms and obtained 260 SMEs.  
Finally, we found information about 310 firms in Hungary. Out of them, data on 247 
firms were covered by the BEEPS latest survey and data on 63 others were obtained 
from the pooled survey. After deleting the large firms and other missing data, we were 
able to use 295 firms which are within the scope of this paper.  
Altogether we obtained data on 793 SMEs from the three mentioned countries. Among 
these 793 firms, 268 firms are classified as micro firms, 385 firms as small firms and 
140 firms as medium firms. The paper used BEEPS definition for firm level 
classification, therefore, a firm is considered as micro firm when the number of 
employees is less than 10, small firms are identified when the number of employees is 
more than 9 but fewer than 50 (10-49) and medium firms are defined as the firms 
having between 50-249 employees.  
Among these 793 firms we found 227 firms that obtained loans from banks and about 
75 per cent of the loans were secured with collateral. The survey shows that about 40 
per cent of firms have at least one owner who is female. The data set also highlights that 
about 30 per cent of the firms have launched new products and services within the 
period of last three years. Considering the crime factors in the examined countries, it is 
quite surprising that about 20 per cent of the firms reported that they have incurred 
losses due to the theft, robbery or arson. Seeing these results, it may signal that SMEs 
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are still facing hostile business conditions in the European countries. On average, the 
firms in the sample received loans with 5 per cent interest rate. The detailed results can 
be seen in table 2. 
With respect to the firm level analysis, we found that 55 micro firms received bank 
loans with an average interest rate of about 5.30 per cent and nearly 71 per cent of the 
loans were secured. Interestingly, women-owned firms are more present in the micro 
segment than any other segments. About 47 per cent firms in this segment have a female 
owner. It may signal that women prefer to establish firms that are easier to manage. 
Within the segments of small and medium firms, 119 small firms and 53 medium firms 
received loans from banks. The descriptive study shows that the average interest rates 
for the small firms was approximately 4.96 per cent while the average interest rate for 
the medium firms were around 4.35 per cent, which is the lowest rate among the 
segments. However, the average value of collateral suggests that about 74 per cent of 
loans are secured for small firms and about 82 per cent loans are pledged with collateral 
for the medium firms. Hence, it suggests that medium firms pledge more collateral than 
micro or small firms. According to the results, it may signal that banks in these three 
countries require higher collateral from firms which have more assets to pledge as 
collateral. Therefore, firms with more assets can be a suitable choice for banks to 
impose collateral requirements on the loan contract.  
Table 3 presents the country level descriptive statistics and the results show that average 
firm age is about 17 years, which is similar in all three countries. We can also see that 
women own both in CR and SKR similar share of firms; about 33 in CR and 30 per cent 
in SKR. In contrary, female ownership is significantly higher in Hungary where women 
own 53 per cent of firms. Results from the CR show that about 50 per cent of firms have 
developed new products and services within the last three years. On the other hand, only 
18 per cent of firms in SKR and 21 per cent of firms in Hungary have innovative 
activities. It reflects that firms in CR have a stronger innovation orientation in 
comparison to the firms in SKR or Hungary. The data also shows that about 35 per cent 
of firms in the CR reported that they incurred losses as a result of theft, robbery and 
arson, which is much higher than in SKR and Hungary. Interestingly, the descriptive 
results suggest that the collateral requirement is similar for small business lending in 
these countries (about 75 per cent of firms provide collateral for bank loans). It may 
mean that these three countries share similar creditor protection rights, which may 
harmonise the collateral requirements for SMEs. Finally, the survey finds that SMEs in 
CR pay higher interest rates (average interest rate is 5.6 %) than in SKR (average 
interest rate 4.5 %) and Hungary (average interest rate 4.6%). As firms in CR face much 
higher obstacles due to crime and theft, this may reflect that firms in CR are riskier than 
those in two other countries.  
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Correlation Analysis  
The data set we used for our analysis consists of cross sectional data, hence, we cannot 
test the possibility of autocorrelation on our examined variables. However, the authors 
run correlation matrix and presented the results in order to find out whether there is a 
collinearity in the model. In table 4 we show the level of correlation between the 
independent variables and it suggests that this study might not have the collinearity 
problem. 
Table 4 Correlation Analysis 
 
Firm 
Size 
Firm 
Age 
Female 
Ownership 
Innovati
on 
Crime/Th
eft 
Collater
al 
Interest 
rate 
Firm Size 1.0000 
      
Firm Age 0.0365 1.0000 
     Female 
Ownership -0.0336 0.0584 1.0000 
    
Innovation -0.0505 -0.0962 -0.0333 1.0000 
   
Crime/Theft 0.1081 0.0419 -0.0392 0.1444 1.0000 
  
Collateral 0.0423 0.0904 -0.0281 0.0131 0.0208 1.0000 
 
Interest rate -0.0658 -0.0409 -0.0164 -0.0082 0.0798 0.0337 1.0000 
This table reports correlation analysis between the independent variables. Source: authors own 
estimation 
Empirical Results 
We present estimation results across firm size and across countries. We separate 
regression results to understand bank lending behaviour for micro, small and medium 
firms. Moreover, the paper presents cross-country regression results for SME financing 
to understand the differences in country level. Therefore, the analyses of the paper have 
valuable attributes to foster knowledge about SME financing behaviour not only from 
firm-level differences perspective but also on country level.  
Table 5 presents the regression results for full sample and we show results from firm 
level segmentation perspective. With respect to the SMEs, we found that the coefficient 
of FIRM SIZE is statistically significant at 1 per cent and positively associated with our 
dependent variable which is LOAN SIZE. This indicates that as the firm size increases 
the loan size also increases. However, this result is not true for the micro firms when we 
look at it from the firm size perspective. The negative coefficient of the relationship 
between loan size and micro firms suggests that micro firms get lower amount of credits 
from banks in our examined countries. Brancati (2015) found similar results in the 
context of Italian market. The result may suggest that larger firms can show better credit 
quality by reducing information opacity and that helps them to get more loans from 
banks. Thus, we may say that reduction of information asymmetry can improve the 
financing possibilities of firms in the loan markets.  
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In the segment of SMEs, unexpectedly, we found that FIRM AGE is negatively related 
to LOAN SIZE but it is not statistically significant. Petersen and Rajan (1995) also found 
a negative relationship between the loan size and firm age in the context of USA. They 
found that mature and older firms need a relatively lower amount of debt from financial 
institutions since they have reserve cash for investment. Moreover, this result can be 
interpreted from the capital structure theory of firms. It could mean that the firms which 
are mature and already in the markets for a long time have accumulated more internal 
assets and can invest their retained earnings (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a result, 
firms which are older require smaller amounts of loans from banks. The hypothesis is 
supported when we look at the micro firms. Therefore, we can say that as a micro firm 
matures, it can provide more information to banks in the form of past track record or it 
is also able to get loans by forming a good relationship with banks (Brancati, 2015; 
Neuberger et al., 2006).  
We found a negative relationship between FEMALE ownership of firms and access to 
bank finance. However, the result is not statistically significant on the SMEs level. A 
statistically significant result is found for the micro firms. Hence, this study provides 
empirical evidence that women-owned firms get a lower amount of credit from the 
formal financial institutions than the male-owned firms do. Our results can be 
interpreted from different perspectives.  Firstly, it might be caused by female owners 
receiving lower amount of finance due to the bank stereotype gender discrimination 
(Carter and Rosa, 1998). Similarly, women-owned firms may lack access to finance 
because they do not have enough assets to pledge as collateral to banks (Lee et al., 
2015). In our case, it is more relevant that women-owned micro firms may have less 
physical assets to pledge as collateral to the bank and thus they face higher credit 
restrictions from banks.  
Unexpectedly we did not find statistically significant results between INNOVATION and 
LOAN SIZE in the segment of SMEs or full sample. However, we found statistically 
significant positive result at 10 per cent level between INNOVATION and access to 
finance only in the case of medium sized firms. Thus, we can infer that innovative firms 
are not penalized by commercial banks in our examined countries. The positive sign of 
innovation and access to finance signals that commercial banks do value the innovation 
activities of the firms by providing financial support. It could mean that commercial 
banks provide funds to innovative firms by assuming that innovative firms have more 
growth prospects in the market. 
We show that CRIME/THEFT is only statistically significant for micro enterprises. The 
result suggests that commercial banks perceive micro firms as riskier if they incur any 
losses due to robbery, theft or arson and based on that micro firms can be denied a 
larger loan. It is legitimate to argue that micro firms have limited resources and if they 
face additional losses because of criminal activities, it can seriously hamper their 
possibility of survival. Hence, it could mean that banks are stricter when rating the 
micro firms which reported that CRIME/THEFT had affected their business because it 
increases their probability of loan default.  
The paper found that COLLATERAL has a positive sign and the results are statistically 
significant across all firm sizes. According to the results, the current study provides 
additional support that availability of collateral can ease the financing possibility for 
Brought to you by | Univerzita Tomase Bati ve Zline
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/7/17 3:26 PM
Volume 17, Issue 3, 2017 
 
277 
SMEs. It is possible that collateral signals better credit quality and confidence of the 
borrower in loan repayment capacity in the examined countries (Bester, 1987; Chan and 
kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). On the other hand, it could mean that 
collateral has a disciplinary role and because of that banks are willing to lend to SMEs 
(Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Brick and Palia, 2007). Hence, the 
result suggests collateral is a significant determinant of SME finance in our examined 
countries.   
Table 5 Results of the Regressions Across Firms’ Size: Dependent Variable: Loan Size 
Variables SMEs Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms 
FIRM SIZE 0.0127*** -0.4001*** 0.052 0.002 
 (0.0042) (0.1362) (0.0336) (0.0079) 
FIRM AGE -0.0535 0.5954** -0.0222 0.0349 
 (0.0693) (0.02698) (0.2183) (0.044) 
FIRM AGE SQUARE 0.0009 -0.0236 -0.0009 0.0084 
 (0.0014) (0.0089) (0.0061) (0.0045) 
FEMALE (Yes=1) -0.176 -1.1648** 0.5372 -1.042 
 (0.3921) (0.5203)) (0.6178) (0.7621) 
INNOVATION (Yes =1) 0.5737 0.1907 0.387 1.4462* 
 
(0.405) (0.5607) (0.6525) (0.8079) 
CRIME/THEFT (Yes =1) 0.4334 -1.3635* 1.0898 0.0698 
 
(0.4509) (0.7406) (0.7042) (0.8138) 
COLLATERAL (Yes =1) 1.6145*** 2.5885*** 1.4740** 0.1084* 
 
(0.4654) (0.6085) (0.7057) (1.165) 
INTEREST RATE 0.0943* 0.1052* 0.0956 0.025 
 
(0.0527) (0.0582) (0.088) (0.1245) 
Constant 9.3543*** 8.8984*** 8.1000*** 11.3294*** 
 
(0.9243) (2.0198) (1.9721) (1.913) 
     Number of Firms 195 48 104 43 
R-squared (%) 14.7 54.6 12.2 13.9 
Note: This table reports results from OLS regression models for the entire sample of firms (SMEs) 
and firm level segmentation. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of loan amount (Loan 
Size). Firm size is the number of full-time employees (FIRM SIZE) and firm age is the number of 
years the firm has been in operation (FIRM AGE). Interest rate is the appropriate interest rates 
charged on the loan (INTEREST RATE). Other explanatory variables are dummy variables 
(FEMALE, INNOVATION, CRIME/THEFT, and COLLATERAL). Significance level: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors are in parenthesises 
Source: Authors own estimation 
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We find that the INTEREST RATE is statistically significant at 10 per cent level for the 
SMEs and micro-firms. This indicates that as the rate of interest increases, the loan size 
increases. It could mean that the higher the amount of loan the higher the risk. 
Therefore, banks may impose a higher interest rate as the loan size increases. Moreover, 
a large loan size can increase the moral hazard issue and for that reason, it might be 
possible that banks charge higher interest rates to receive their compensation as quickly 
as possible. One can raise question why a bank would provide credit to a borrower 
knowing it was substantially risky? We argue that inter-bank competition may affect the 
bank decision to provide credit to the risky borrowers and a high interest rate is an 
incentive for the lenders to increase their profit margin. 
Table 6 Results of the Regressions at Country-Level: Dependent Variable: Loan Size 
Variables Czech Republic Slovak Republic Hungary 
FIRM SIZE 0.0166*** 0.0157 0.0106 
 (0.0039) (0.0135) (0.0048) 
FIRM AGE -0.1608 -0.2201 -0.0881 
 (0.189) (0.1582) (0.1243) 
FIRM AGE SQUARE 0.0052 0.0032 0.0021 
 (0.0059) (0.00277) (0.0029) 
FEMALE (Yes= 1) -0.2508 -0.0952* -0.6525** 
 (0.3362) (1.0541) (0.577) 
INNOVATION (Yes =1) 0.3734 1.1481 -0.2704 
 
(0.3224) (1.1798) (0.5831) 
CRIME/THEFT (Yes =1) 0.32 -0.0092* -0.8404 
 
(0.3133) (1.3931) (0.797) 
COLLATERAL (Yes =1) 0.6456 3.3339*** 0.4740* 
 
(0.4196) (1.2751) (0.6112) 
INTEREST RATE -0.1765*** 0.3821 0.0297 
 
(0.0571) (0.1853) (0.0594) 
Constant 12.7082*** 7.3551*** 11.8276 
 
(1.5715) (2.2071) (1.4375) 
    Number of Firms 71 58 66 
R-squared (%) 46.1 27.7 14.0 
Note: This table reports results from OLS regression models at country level segmentation. The 
dependent variable is natural logarithm of loan amount (Loan Size). Firm size is the number of 
full-time employees (FIRM SIZE) and firm age is the number of years the firm has been in 
operation (FIRM AGE). Interest rate is the appropriate interest rates charged on the loan 
(INTEREST RATE). Other explanatory variables are dummy variables (FEMALE, INNOVATION, 
CRIME/THEFT, and COLLATERAL). Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are in parenthesises 
Source: Authors own estimation 
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Table 6 presents regression results at country level determinants of SME financing. We 
control for the same variables as we did for the firm size level.  
At first, the result suggests that FIRM SIZE has a positive effect on access to finance in 
all countries. However, the result is statistically significant only in the case of CR. The 
result stresses that banks in Czech Republic consider firm’s size to be a positive signal 
while considering a loan application. This positive effect of firm size and loan size 
shows further evidence that as firms get bigger it can signal positive information to 
banks about their credibility. Moreover, the results also support that higher information 
transparency can ease the possibility of getting a bank loan (Ferri and Murro, 2015; 
Bolton et al., 2013).  
FIRM AGE has a negative coefficient in each country, but it is not statistically 
significant. This result signals that regardless of the country, mature firms ask for a 
lower amount of bank loans. It is more likely that they invest their cash reserve or 
financial slack.  
The results for FEMALE dummy have significant negative coefficient with LOAN SIZE 
in SKR and Hungary, but the result is not significant in the context of CR. This result 
may indicate that banks in CR do not discriminate against loan size based on gender 
differences. However, results from the SKR and Hungary are suggesting that female 
borrowers do receive a smaller amount of credit from banks than male borrowers. 
Although we did not examine at what basis female borrowers receive smaller amount of 
loans, it may come from supply side gender discrimination effect from banks or it is 
possible that female borrowers restrict themselves from asking for larger loans.  
The paper did not find any significant effect of INNOVATION and access to finance in 
our examined countries. Thus, we cannot deduce that the innovative firms are more 
financially constrained than the non-innovative firms. This result may encourage 
innovative firms to ask for bank loans as our result suggests that innovative firms get 
similar preferences from banks as the non-innovators.  
We found that CRIME/THEFT has a negative coefficient in the context of SKR, but not 
in two other countries. Hence, we may infer that SMEs in SKR located in the area 
where the frequency of crime is higher are more likely to be financially constrained by 
banks. Hence, firm riskiness is an important determinant of access to finance in one out 
of our three examined countries.  
COLLATERAL has a positive effect on getting bank loans in each examined country. 
However, only results from SKR and Hungary are statistically significant. This means 
that collateral is significantly valued by the banks in these countries while lending to 
SMEs. It is also possible that banks in SKR and Hungary take a conservative approach 
in lending to SMEs and hence ask for collateral to protect their loan portfolio from bad 
loans because in the event of defaulted loans a bank can liquidate the securitized 
collateral and get back the extended loans, which is also proposed by Blazy and Weill 
(2013). On the other hand, it may signal that SMEs in SKR and Hungary are more credit 
worthy and they would like to show their credit quality by providing more collateral. 
Considering this result, it might be possible to say that collateral acts as a signalling 
device for banks in sorting the high-quality borrowers from the bad borrowers, which is 
highlighted by Bester (1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987). 
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Finally, we see that INTEREST RATE has a negative effect on loan size in CR and the 
result is statistically significant. This result shows that when interest rates are high, 
SMEs in this market demand a lower amount of bank loans as it increases their debt 
burden. However, we did not find any significant results for the other two countries. 
This result further supports our descriptive studies where we showed that banks in CR 
charge higher interest rates than banks in SKR and Hungary.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the determinants of access to finance for SMEs in the 
context of three Central European countries – CR, SKR, and Hungary. The access to 
finance was a proxy variable captured by the loan size. BEEPS V, , which is a joint 
project of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World 
Bank (WB), provides the data set we used for our empirical analysis. We analysed five 
borrower characteristics and two loan specific characteristics for assessing the 
determinants of access to finance.  
The results are mixed and we found that firm-level characteristics are more depended on 
the firm classification (for example: micro, small and medium firms) rather than 
comprehensive results for the whole SME segment. For example, while the result 
suggests firm size has a positive relationship with access to finance for SMEs, it has a 
negative coefficient for micro firms. That means micro firms are facing even more 
financing obstacles from commercial banks. With respect to the firm age, we found 
significant positive results for micro firms with access to finance. That means micro 
firms can show better information quality to banks when they get older and mature. The 
results for female ownership showed that women-owned firms experience more 
financial constraints than the men-owned firms do. This suggests that the potential 
gender discrimination in the loan market is also a concern for developed European 
countries.  
With respect to innovation, our result indicates that innovative SMEs are not more 
financially constrained than the non-innovative firms. Rather a positive coefficient 
suggests that innovative firms are encouraged by banks in the form of access to finance. 
It is also possible to see that micro firms are facing financing barriers if they 
experienced crime/theft. Hence, crime/theft adds additional financial barriers for micro 
firms when they want to ask for loans from banks. The paper finds evidence that 
collateral has a positive effect on loan size for all firms; it also reflects the fact that 
banks in these three countries are more comfortable in collateral-based lending. Finally, 
we found evidence that the interest rate positively affects access to finance in the 
segment of SMEs on the whole, and for micro firms. It may reflect that as the loan size 
increases, banks are also charging higher loan price due to increased risk with loan size. 
On the other hand, micro firms are more vulnerable to defaults and for that reason, 
banks may ask for higher rates from the micro firms.   
With respect to the country level perspective, we find that only firm size and interest 
rate are statistically significant in the CR. However, firm size has a positive effect while 
interest rate has a negative effect on access to finance. Therefore, we can say that 
commercial banks in the CR consider firm size to be a positive signal for extending 
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loans to SMEs. Conversely, a higher interest rate in CR in comparison to SKR and 
Hungary creates barriers for SMEs to asking for larger loans. In the context of SKR and 
Hungary, we found that female ownership and the pledge of collateral are statistically 
significant. According to our expectation, we found that female ownership reduces the 
likelihood of accessing to finance for the SMEs but the pledge of collateral can enhance 
it. Therefore, referring to our results we may say that gender discrimination is a 
prevailing fact in the loan markets and it is not only the case for developing countries, 
but also for the developed European markets. Finally, positive effect of collateral on 
access to finance suggests that the pledge of collateral may increase the confidence level 
of banks to extend credits to SMEs. Although we did not empirically examine whether 
the positive effect of collateral on access to finance comes from the reduction of adverse 
selection or moral hazard issue, it can be an interesting future research scope.  
The results of this paper have a few policy implications. Firstly, an appropriate policy 
could be helpful for the firms which are credit constrained and owned by women. 
Implementing such a policy could encourage female entrepreneurs, which can foster 
economic growth of the country. Secondly, as we confirmed that SMEs are credit 
constrained due to the collateral requirement, it could be useful to rethink the collateral 
requirements in particular for the SMEs. Finally, regulators may take initiatives to 
reduce the interest rate for SMEs, which can foster the growth of the SMEs and, 
therefore, contribute to the economy. 
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